Turkey has long retained the record of individual applications before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). On the other hand, the ECtHR has been playing a crucial role in the democratization of this country, as most of its rulings were followed by substantial reforms. This, however, cannot conceal a dichotomy: although the reforms reflect the political will of the government, the decisions rendered by national courts often indicate the opposite, hampering the democratization process and leaving the country with a judiciary impasse. The reasons and consequences of this phenomenon are analyzed in this essay.
I. INTRoDUCTIoN
Turkey recognized the binding jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 1990. Since then the ECtHR had received more petitions from Turkey than from any other signatory of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)-until Russia became party to the Convention. In late 2010, the Court had delivered 2,573 judgments concerning Turkey, of which 2,245 found at least one violation of the Convention. 1 Violations therefore amounted to 87 percent, democracy through its impact on the country's legal system. Since Ankara recognized the right to individual applications in 1987 and the binding jurisdiction of the Court in 1990, the verdicts of the Court have been instrumental in legitimizing a much wider spectrum of liberal and individual models of rights than those guaranteed thus far by largely state-centric Turkish law. This means that the Turkish judiciary not only tackled cases from the perspective of an authoritarian/communitarian tradition but also remained impervious to international human rights law. Considered at first only as "supporting norms," those international instruments began to be taken into consideration by the Constitutional Court as "supra-constitutional norms" in 1990, before Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution on the force of international agreements was amended in 2004 so as to give the ECHR and the case law of ECtHR direct effect and supremacy over national law. Yet, the Turkish judiciary remains indifferent or "skeptical about applying the Convention to linguistic, religious, and expressive freedoms, citing concerns over maintaining national unity." And except for a few palliative cases, "lower courts almost never cite international law." 5 However, if an incompatibility exists between national law and the ECHR, this ought to be remedied in favor of the Convention, not only by the executive and the legislative, but also by judicial organs themselves. In doing so, the national judges should take into account the very nature of this Convention, which bestows upon all of the signatories certain objective responsibilities that exist without depending upon other states parties through reciprocity. It should also be remembered that according to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." 6 Moreover, the European Convention creates a common judicial space as the rulings of the Court reflect Europe's common values and legal standards. As a candidate for EU membership, Turkey cannot afford to remain outside this space given that it is important for its judiciary to consider itself as part of a supranational legal community. 7 It is self-evident that for the ECtHR, the most important criterion in judging the restrictions of individual freedoms is to determine whether these state-imposed limitations are necessary in a democratic society. And among the necessary conditions for a society to be democratic, the Court deems pluralism indispensable. Pluralism is, above all, important for the exercise of the freedom of expression. But this is also valid for religious freedom, minority rights, and political parties. 8 That is why this analysis will focus on these particular areas of incompatibility between the rulings of the ECtHR and Turkey's jurisprudence.
freedom of Expression
Much of the Court's caseload on the freedom of expression comes from Turkey. As of 2012, the Court has rendered around 207 judgments on cases originating from Turkey, with many more awaiting judgment. The judiciary continues to attach a higher importance to the restrictions formulated in Article 10 of the ECHR 9 on freedom of expression, rather than its general spirit and the jurisprudence of the Court:
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a [democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and . . . it is applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive . . . but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic society." 10 Judgments rendered by the ECtHR and later the reforms required by the EU candidacy process have led to a series of constitutional amendments and ordinary legislation in Turkey. It started with a small but significant change made in Article 26 of the Constitution -deleting the phrase "language prohibited by law" included in the text with a view to ban the use of Kurdish.
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Freedom of the press benefited from a similar improvement through the abrogation of the rule imposed by Article 28, which state that "Publications cannot be made in a language prohibited by law." 12 In 1993, the abolition of the state monopoly on radio and television broadcasting also contributed to Freedom of expression by enhancing pluralism of opinion in Turkey. But the most significant improvements in the field of freedom of expression have been accomplished through legislative amendments. Among them, the 1991 Anti-Terror Law comes first as it repealed Articles 141, 142, and 163 of the former Penal Code, which aimed at punishing communist and anti-secular propaganda. Its Article 8, related to "propaganda against the indivisible unity of the State," was abrogated in 2003, and its Article 7 was amended in conformity with the ECtHR jurisprudence, limiting freedom of expression only in cases of incitement to violence. 13 The Penal Code followed with the modification of a) its Article 312 penalizing the incitement to hostility and hatred on the basis of class, race, religion and region, amended to limit the criminal offense to cases of danger for public order, and b) its Article 159 related to the insult of the Republic, Turkishness, the Grand National Assembly, the government, the military, and the like, all considered criminal offenses until the amendment excluded the intention of pure criticism from this context. However, the Anti-Terror Law was amended again in 2006 to strengthen its restrictive provisions, evidently in response to the military's demands for more effective sanctions against terrorist activities.
14 At the same time, non-violent expressions of opinion continued to be the object of pursuit through certain provisions maintained in the Penal Code of 2005. Article 216 allows the condemnation of those who incite to hostility and hatred in the case of "evident and close danger," preferred over the term "clear and present danger" used by the United States Supreme Court, probably because it confers a larger margin of appreciation by the prosecutors. 15 New Article 305 prohibiting "acting against fundamental national interests" has been illustratively justified by the Parliamentary Committee of Justice as applicable to a "citizen who called for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus or who declared that the Armenian genocide took place."
16 But Article 301 (former Article 159) remains, by far, the most controversial despite its amendment in 2008, through which the notion of "Turkishness" has been replaced by the term "Turkish nation," the upper limit of the three-year imprisonment has been reduced to two years, the opening of an investigation has become dependent on the approval of the Ministry of Justice, and the disposition on the "increase of penalty in case the insult takes place outside Turkish territory," has been abrogated. Nevertheless, the spirit remains and Article 301 illustrates par excellence the incompatibility between Turkish jurisprudence and the rulings of the ECtHR. Dink v. Turkey is a case in point because of its highly symbolic political and human dimensions, as well as the divergence between the interpretations of the The ECtHR concluded that Turkey violated Article 10 of the Convention, as opposed to the verdict reached by the Court of Cassation. 18 According to the latter, Turkishness refers to one of the constitutive elements of the state, namely the human element, that is the "Turkish nation." As such, Turkishness is "the whole of national and moral values, composed of human, religious and historical values, as well as the mother tongue, patriotic feelings and national traditions." 19 The judges of Strasbourg contend that the way the Court of Cassation interpreted the notion of Turkishness had a dual impact on the interests that Article 301 intends to safeguard. First, the notion identified with the state and, indirectly, with the government and its policies and institutions, through its reference to the Turkish nation as a constitutive element of the state; second, by limiting Turkishness to the religious, historical, and linguistic belongingness, the Court of Cassation excluded all such minorities from the definition of Turkishness. Thus interpreted, for the Court of Cassation, the notions of Turkishness or Turkish nation have become the symbols of state policy on identity. This policy on identity has been applied to the question of the Armenian minority. Consequently, any criticism directed at this policy, such as toward the official thesis on the events of 1915, could be perceived as "devaluating or denigrating" Turkishness or the Turkish nation.
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When Dink expressed his resentment against what he considered as the denial of the events of 1915, he did nothing but communicate his ideas and opinions on a question of incontestable general interest in a democratic society. The Court considers it crucial for such a society that a historical debate of particular gravity can take place freely.
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With regard to Article 10, the Court also underlined the positive obligations of the state, such as creating a favorable environment in which all persons are able to participate in public debates and express, without fear, their ideas and opinions, including those contrary to the ones protected by the authorities or held by the majority of public opinion, even if the comments are irritating or shocking. Yet another example of disparity between the interpretations of Turkish and European jurisdictions is from Article 6 of the Anti-Terror Law of 2006. The Article stipulates that the publication of any periodical containing elements of propaganda in favor of a terrorist organization or the incitement to commit acts of terror within such an organization can be temporarily suspended for fifteen to thirty days. In 2009, the Turkish Constitutional Court ruled that the Article was in conformity with the Constitution as it aimed to protect the unity and the indivisibility of the state, deeming it a necessary rule for the continuity of the democratic society. The ECtHR, however, had a different interpretation of the article in the case of Ürper and Others, who took to the Court for the banning of four daily newspapers. Turkey was condemned for violating Article 10 and the Court considered that such prior restraints on publication entailed implicit sanctions on the applicants to dissuade them from publishing in the future. Freedom of the press was at stake and less draconian measures could have been envisaged. The decision to ban these newspapers went beyond the necessary restraints in a democratic society and practically amounted to censorship.
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The above-mentioned articles continue to be used to prosecute journalists, writers, editors, or academics in Turkey. The European Commission argues that freedom of expression is undermined by the high number of legal cases and investigations against these people and undue pressure on the media as "Turkey's legal and judicial practices, legislation criminal procedures and political responses are obstacles to the free exchange of information and ideas." 24 In his last report on the freedom of expression in Turkey, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe observed that most of these types of violations "stem from a lack of proportionality in the interpretation and application of the existing statutory provisions by courts and prosecutors." 25 He also expressed his concern over the interpretation of the concept of incitement to violence and civil defamation proceedings. Neither of these was compliant with the case law of the ECtHR. This explains why, despite constitutional and legislative reforms, there are such a high number of applications pending before the Court of Strasbourg.
b. Minority Rights
The ECHR does not contain a specific article on the protection of minorities. Article 14 and Protocol 12 on non-discrimination partly tackle the issue, 23 The minority provisions of the Lausanne Treaty, which is considered the founding document of the Republic, were inspired by the Polish Treaty of 1919, based upon the principles of non-discrimination and identity protection. But unlike the post-World War I treaties that determined a minority regime, which included ethnic, linguistic, and religious criteria, Lausanne had a selective approach reflecting the wishes of the Turkish government. This excluded other sectarian Muslim minorities like Alevis, as well as various ethnic and linguistic groups such as Kurds, Arabs, and those of Balkan or Caucasus descent, falling short of international legal standards. The Western powers accepted these terms in order to protect the non-Muslim portion of the population. Recognized as fundamental laws by Turkey (Article 37), the stipulations contained in Articles 38-44 of the Lausanne Treaty granted nonMuslim minorities equality with Muslims under law. 26 The treaty guaranteed protection against discrimination, the right to establish charitable, religious, and social institutions, and access to schools that taught native languages. The Turkish government was made responsible for supporting and protecting all of these institutions. According to Article 44, these provisions were considered obligations of international interest and could not be modified without the consent of the League of Nations. But Turkey's subsequent legislation, case law, and practice introduced a long era of violations with regard to the dispositions of the Lausanne Treaty.
In light of the "Turkification" campaigns of the early Republican era, many laws and regulations included stipulations that explicitly required "being of Turkish race or descent" in order, for example, to apply for public service 26 . Treaty of Lausanne (1912) , available at https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/boshtml/ bos142.htm.
or perform certain professions. 27 Highly discriminatory practices have also taken place, such as the 1942 Wealth Tax, aiming at eliminating non-Muslims from the country's economic life, while violating Articles 38, 39, and 40 of the Treaty of Lausanne. 28 The Incidents of 6-7 September 1955 and the 1964 extradition of Greeks with Greek passports, both ignited by the Cyprus issue, aimed at clearing the country of non-Muslims. Although these were of temporary nature like all crises, one issue has remained throughout time and has played a crucial role in determining, or rather revealing, Turkey's attitude towards these communities: the question of foundations.
Since Ottoman times, community foundations regulated the social lives of non-Muslims and supported their religious, educational, healthcare, and charitable institutions. They also managed immense wealth in the form of real estate. Despite the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty, which provided legal protection for these institutions, major laws and practices in violation of Lausanne were introduced with a vision to exercise state control over their management and property. The 1926 Civil Code, while approving the establishment of new foundations, excluded non-Muslim ones by prohibiting foundations "that support members of a certain race or community." 29 The 1930 Municipality Law 30 provided for the transfer of cemeteries to municipalities and constituted the basis for taking over non-Muslim cemeteries from their foundations. The 1935 Law on Foundations 31 required all foundations to submit a property declaration by 1936, which they did, and non-Muslim foundations continued to acquire property by various court decisions. But later, the declarations made in 1936 were considered to be the founding acts of these foundations and because they carried no provisions concerning new acquisitions, any property acquired after 1936 was deemed illegal. This paved the way for the seizure of hundreds of properties by the Directorate Non-Muslim foundations waged a legal war for many years against these policies before exhausting all domestic remedies. After 1999, when Turkey's EU candidacy became official, non-Muslims started filing complaints before the ECtHR. The first ruling, which created a precedent for forty or so cases, came in 2007 on the Fener Greek High School Foundation case. The Court ruled that Turkey's real estate policy and the 1936 practice were unlawful. The Court ordered Turkey to re-register the seized property to the foundation's name within three months of the final judgment date or pay 890,000 euros to the foundation if the re-registration did not occur within the three months. 33 Shortly after this ruling, the two consecutive complaints by the Foundation for the Surp Pırgiç Armenian Hospital in Istanbul for the return of its three buildings by the Treasury were concluded against Turkey. The parties opted for friendly settlement, but when the Court recommended paying more than 2 million euros as a condition of friendly settlement, Turkey decided to return the properties instead, which created a second precedent. 34 The second conviction for confiscating the property of a nonMuslim foundation concerned the orphanage building belonging to the Fener Greek Patriarchate on the Prince's Island in Istanbul. The ECtHR ruled that taking over the orphanage built in 1902 for Greek Orthodox children breached Article I of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, protecting property rights. 35 As this was followed by three different convictions over various properties of an Armenian foundation in just 2008 alone, it became clear that Turkey could not escape Strasbourg's pressure.
As a result, along with various EU-induced reform packages, the Law on Foundations was amended three times in five years. First, foundations were allowed to acquire property under government supervision, then, control was transferred the to the Directorate General on Foundations, and finally they released this right and ruled for the return of seized property under certain conditions. 36 But the most spectacular change was the further amendment of this new law by decree of the Council of Ministers in August 2011. Provisional Article 17 of the new law (No. 5737) ruled for the return of all properties seized through the 1936 Declaration as well as compensation to be paid for those now belonging to third persons. 37 Since then, many properties were returned to the foundations, including the orphanage building in November 2010. According to a decision in April 2012 by the Directorate General on Foundations, all non-Muslim cemeteries are also to be returned to their communities, thus abrogating the 1930 Municipality Law. In the meantime, twenty-four more foundations addressed the Directorate General for the return of immovable properties that they used to possess in the past.
While political will has ended up prevailing over the judiciary in this long and painful saga, some serious problems remain. There is a lack of legal personality for religious communities. For example, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate's claim to use the title "ecumenical," which has thus far been rejected by the Turkish government, and the re-opening of the Heybeliada Greek Orthodox theological college (the Halki seminary), which had been closed since 1971. Turkey refused the appointment of foreign clergy as a solution to the Halki problem. In its decision of 26 June 2007, the Court of Cassation upheld the official position to the effect that only those of Turkish nationality could work in Turkey and that the Patriarchate was devoid of legal personality. Whereas the Venice Commission adopted a stance at its 12-13 March 2010 meeting on those three inter-related issues and quoted several decisions by the ECtHR. The Court stressed that freedom of religion is not merely an individual right but also has a collective dimension. Consequently, Article 9 of the ECHR on freedom of religion should be interpreted in conjunction with Article 11 on freedom of association. 38 Thus, once again, the rulings of the ECtHR stand in opposition with the jurisprudence of the Turkish high courts.
C. Party Closures
Turkish legislation and practices with regard to party closures constitute one of the most important "democracy deficits" in Turkey gravated by an even longer and more draconian list in the Law on Political Parties. 39 Thus, under Article 80 of this law, political parties shall not aim at changing the unitary nature of the state. Under Article 81, they shall not "maintain that there are minorities in the territory of Turkey, based on differences of national or religious culture, or race, or language;" they shall not "harm national unity by way of creating minorities in the territory of the Republic of Turkey through protecting, developing or spreading languages and cultures other than the Turkish language or culture;" and shall not use material in languages other than Turkish in their propaganda and political activities. Under Article 85, they shall not demean the personality, activities, and memory of Atatürk; and under Article 89, they shall not aim at changing the official status of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. To aggravate the situation further, the Turkish Constitutional Court has implemented these provisions with an excessive zeal and rigidity. Thus, it has closed down six parties under the 1961 Constitution, and nineteen parties under the 1982 Constitution. Most of these rulings were based on the alleged violations of the constitutional provisions protecting the indivisible national and territorial integrity of the state or its secular character.
An example of the Turkish Constitutional Court's restrictive interpretation of the territorial unity of the state can be found in its ruling on the Democratic Party. The Court stated that The Constitution which is based on the principle of unitary state, does not permit federal state. Therefore, political parties cannot include federal system in their program, and cannot advocate such a structure. . . . As the principle of nation-state does not permit the notion of a multinational state, there is no room for a federal structure in such a system. 40 In the same ruling, the Court preclude even regional states by stating that "the Constitution is closed to such discriminatory procedures as autonomy or self-rule for regions," even though a regional state is a variant of a unitary state. 41 Evidently, the Court confuses the Constitution in force with the demands for peacefully changing it, federalism with multi-nationalism, and regionalism with federalism. Expectedly, the ECtHR found the closure of the Democratic Party as a violation of the Convention. 39. This was also adopted during the National Security Council (NSC) Despite some relatively modest improvements brought about by the constitutional amendments of 2001 and 2010, Turkish legislation and practice concerning the prohibition of parties are still far from being in conformity with the current European standards. The Venice Commission, in an influential report adopted in 1999 and entitled "Guidelines on Prohibition and Dissolution of Political Parties and Analogous Measures," argued that prohibition or enforced dissolution of political parties may only be justified in the case of parties that advocate the use of violence or use violence as a means to overthrow the democratic constitutional order, thereby undermining the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that a party advocates a peaceful change to the Constitution should not be sufficient for its prohibition or dissolution. The standards developed by the ECtHR seem somewhat more restrictive than those of the Venice Commission. Thus, the ECtHR decided in the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) case that not only the means used by a political party "must be legal and democratic," but also the change proposed must itself be compatible with the fundamental democratic principles. It necessarily follows that a political party whose leaders incite violence or put forward a policy that fails to respect democracy or aims at the destruction of democracy cannot lay claim to the Convention's protection against penalties imposed on these grounds. In view of the very clear link between the Convention and democracy, no one must be authorized to rely on the Convention's provisions in order to weaken or destroy the ideals and values of a democratic society. 44 Turkish rules and practices concerning the prohibition of political parties deviate from common European norms from a procedural point of view, in that the power to start prohibition proceedings rests solely with the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation. In a report on Turkey, the Venice Commission criticizes this system stating that the Turkish model of giving this competence to one official-the Public Prosecutor-makes the system subject to his discretion, which is problematic since the initiation of the procedure by itself will normally be a dramatic event that may have severe impact on the political climate and may cause considerable instability 45 [T]his stands in contrast to other European countries that have rules on party closure, in which-because of the exceptional nature of such cases-the decision to raise a case either rests with the democratic political institutions or at least is subject to some element of direct or indirect democratic control.
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The Commission further observes that the most striking feature of the Turkish rules on party closure is that they combine a very long list of material criteria for prohibition or dissolution with a very low procedural threshold. . . . The basic problem with the present Turkish rules on party closure is that the general threshold is too low, both for initiating procedures for and for prohibiting or dissolving parties. 47 Finally, other consequences of closure rulings, such as the forfeiture of parliamentary seats for those deputies of the party who caused its closure by their own words and deeds (Article 84 of the Constitution), and the five year ban on political activities for those members who caused the closure of the party by their own words and deeds (Article 69) were found disproportionate by the ECtHR; therefore, they constituted a violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 on the freedom of election. 48 The provisions on the forfeiture of parliamentary membership were repealed by the constitutional amendments of 2010.
The Constitutional Court has also interpreted and implemented the constitutional provisions on secularism with an excessive zeal and rigidity. Thus, it has closed down five parties on account of their alleged anti-secular activities. main piece of evidence for the AKP's alleged anti-secular activities was the 2008 constitutional amendment that aimed to abolish the headscarf ban at universities. 49 Of these prohibition rulings, many were found by the ECtHR to be in violation of the ECHR. The only exception was the WP (Welfare Party, RP) case where the ECtHR decided that there had been no violation of the Convention, citing certain statements by the RP spokesmen "who had publicly referred with approval to the possibility of using force against politicians who opposed them," 50 and arguing on the other hand that the RP's advocacy for a sharia-based government, particularly its proposal for a plurality of legal systems, were not compatible with democracy. The ECtHR concluded that it is difficult to declare one's respect for democracy and human rights while simultaneously supporting a regime based on sharia, which clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to criminal law and procedure. The rules on the legal status of women and intervention in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts that are a part of sharia law do not conform to the values of the Convention. "In the Court's view, a political party whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing sharia in a state party to the Convention can hardly be regarded as an association complying with the democratic ideal that underlies the whole of the Convention."
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In sum, the effects of the ECtHR rulings on Turkish legislation and practice of party prohibitions seem to be limited, although in a modestly positive direction. Thus, the forfeiture of parliamentary membership, as a result of the closure ruling of the Constitutional Court, was repealed by the constitutional amendments of 2010. The same amendment also raised the quorum for a prohibition ruling from three-fifths to two-thirds of the Constitutional Court judges, thus making the closure of parties more difficult. However, certain other liberalizing measures in the amendment proposal failed to receive the requisite majority of the Assembly and were dropped from the proposal, such as repealing the political bans imposed upon certain party members who caused the prohibition of their party by their own words and actions. The ECtHR also found this penalty excessive and disproportionate. On the other hand, there seems to be a modest improvement in the rulings of the Constitutional Court in recent years. Thus, in 2008, the Court decided to deprive the AKP of half of its state funding for one year instead of closing it down, even though the ruling was still based on an excessively rigid and militant understanding of secularism.
52 Even more significantly, the Court, 
III. PART II: THE TURkISH JUDICIARY AS THE CoRE ISSUE: PRobLEMS AND DEVELoPMENTS
It is self-evident that, despite an impressive record of constitutional and legislative reforms realized by the Turkish government in the last decade, the ECtHR continues to remain the ultimate recourse for defending civil and political rights in Turkey. This indicates that the problem lies with the prevailing mentality and standard operating procedures of the judiciary and state apparatus.
A. Attitudinal Problems within the Judiciary
Civic nationalism and state-centrism constitute the core values and references for the Turkish judiciary and bureaucracy. The particular strength of Turkish nationalism stems from the supra-ideological status that has been conferred to it since the early years of the Republic. This was done in order to create a "pure" Turkish identity as opposed to the cosmopolitan nature of the Ottoman Empire. This ethno-confessional approach, based on the unity of race and religion, has been further enhanced by a centralized and authoritarian system of education as well as the traditional influence of the military. Moreover, the historical experience of a dismantled Empire at the end of World War I has exacerbated a constant perception of threat, originating from external and internal "enemies" that could endanger national unity and territorial integrity. 55 As a result, Turkey inherited a militant, and often on the verge of paranoid, nationalism as the main component of collective mentality. This is best reflected by the principles and practice of the state apparatus, suspicious of the "Other," be it liberals, minorities, or international institutions. This explains the negative approach of the Turkish courts toward the rights of the individuals by their refusal or incapacity to implement the ECHR. As a major impediment to the development of political liberalism, the Turkish legal complex has been mobilised to consolidate the regime by both eliminating the potential threats and providing legal justifications for the authoritarian behaviour of the regime. Thus the legal complex has functioned as part and parcel of both the repressive and ideological state apparatus, to use Althusser's terms. The Turkish legal complex, the judiciary at its centre, has consistently sought to align itself with the ruling stratum of the Republic.
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This has led to the politicization of the judiciary and the judicialization of politics.
Besides the jurisprudence itself, the above arguments are justified by data provided by the most comprehensive research and through polling conducted among the Turkish judiciary in recent years. 57 Based on "in-depth interviews," this research aimed at shedding light on the thought processes of judges and prosecutors and how they approach the concepts of state, justice, and rights. Some of their answers are worth quoting: "If my country is at stake, if my homeland or nation is at stake, I do not care about law!," 58 "My state; first comes my state!," 59 "Which one has more priority: the state or the democracy? . . . As the Public Prosecutor of course I have to protect the state and the regime. I am the regime's prosecutor." 60 In another study based on an analysis of some decisions of the Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation, it is concluded that judicial authorities act with a statist reflex in a considerable portion of the decisions they cast. Particularly in cases with political content, efforts such as "protecting the state" and "observing the interests of the state" do indeed exist. over domestic law in case of conflict as a violation of national sovereignty. Some of them question the amendment, "What does it mean that the Parliament cannot issue laws against international conventions? Then where does this leave our sovereignty!" 62 Others simply reject it on ultra-nationalist grounds. "I do not find pertinent or appropriate any of the signatures put under any convention that is binding on Turkey . . . the officials going there do not know our culture or our history."
63 As far as the rulings of the ECtHR are concerned, they are perceived by some as "prejudiced" and indicator of "the double standard" of the Court against Turkey, whereas others think they are "not so prejudiced" and "accurate."
64 But even the latter "admit" that the judges of Strasbourg "sometimes give political decisions." A large majority of the interviewees, regardless of whether they have a positive or negative approach to the amendment of Article 90, stated that the international human rights norms are not taken into account in trials. 65 The judicial mentality described above can be attributed to the special features of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process. The late Ottoman modernization was carried out by a small, Westernized bureaucratic and military elite, often disregarding the more traditional and religious attitudes of the masses. This pattern also shaped the modernizing reforms of the early republican period even in a more radical mood. Both the Young Turk revolution (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) and the Kemalist revolution (1920-1946) can be described as examples of top-down revolutions, or "revolutions from above." Both revolutions were carried out by strongly nationalist and militantly secularist elites. Therefore, the ruling military and bureaucratic elites, including the judiciary, saw as their "mission" to preserve the legacy of a national, unitary, and secular state, if necessary, at the cost of democratic rights and freedoms. Part of this legal and political culture, again with roots going back to the Ottoman times, is the tendency to give priority to the "sublime interests of the state" as opposed to the individual rights and freedoms. This pattern goes a long way in explaining the generally illiberal and statist attitudes of the judiciary.
b. Recent Structural Reforms in the Judiciary

Issues Relating to the Independence of the Judiciary and the Security of Tenure for Judges
It goes without saying that for the independence of the judiciary to carry any real meaning, the security of tenure for judges should be effectively guaran- teed. In most Western democracies, this is secured by the establishment of high judicial councils, which are independent of the executive, to deal with the personal matters of judges, such as appointments, promotions, transfers, disciplinary proceedings, and dismissals. Although there is no single European model for the composition of such councils, the most widespread practice is to have a mixed body, the majority of which consists of judges elected by their peers. Thus, in a 2007 report, the Venice Commission stated that:
A balance needs to be struck between judicial independence and self-administration on the one side and the necessary accountability of the judiciary on the other side in order to avoid negative effects of corporatism within the judiciary. . . . One way to achieve this goal is to establish a judicial council with a balanced composition of its members. . . . An overwhelming supremacy of the judicial component may raise concerns related to the risks of "corporatist management." The participation of the legislative branch in the composition of such an authority is characteristic. In a system guided by democratic principles, it seems reasonable that the Council of Justice should be linked to the representation of the will of the people, as expressed by Parliament. its own members, one regular and one substitute member by the plenary of the Turkish Academy of Justice from among its own members, seven regular and four substitute members by all judges and public prosecutors of general courts from among first degree judges and public prosecutors, and three regular and two substitute members by all administrative court judges and public prosecutors from among first degree administrative judges and public prosecutors. The amended Article 159 also stipulated that four regular members shall be elected from among law professors and practicing lawyers by the President of the Republic. Clearly, the present arrangement has the advantage of representing the entire judiciary, not only the two high courts. Indeed, close to half of its regular members (ten out of twenty-two) are elected by all general and administrative judges and public prosecutors, in addition to five regular members elected by the two high courts, without any interference by the executive branch. "Thus, the judge members constitute an almost two-thirds majority of the Council with regard to the four members elected by the President of the Republic from among qualified persons." 67 The Venice Commission, in an opinion adopted in December 2010, stated that the changes reflected "the criteria of the Venice Commission on a number of points and should, in general, be welcomed as a substantive and definite step in the right direction" before concluding that "the new HSYK is formally a much more independent institution than its predecessor, and the new system formally fulfills most European standards." 68 
Constitutional Complaint
The original text of the 1982 Constitution did not recognize the right to put forward a constitutional complaint for individuals. The 2010 amendment to Article 148 introduces this right. Thus, it is stipulated that:
Everyone may apply to the Constitutional Court on the grounds that one of the fundamental rights and freedoms within the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution has been violated by public authorities. In order to make an application, ordinary legal remedies must be exhausted. In the individual application, judicial review shall not be made for matters which would be taken into account during the process of recourse to legal remedies. Procedures and principles concerning the individual application shall be laid down in law.
The introduction of constitutional complaint has long been advocated for by a majority of legal scholars and human rights activists, even though the two high courts remained cool to the idea for fear that it would elevate the Constitutional Court to the position of a super appellate court over the decisions of the two high courts. Clearly, however, the Constitutional Court's examination will not be extended to the facts of the case, but will be limited to an examination of the question of unconstitutionality.
The details related to constitutional complaints have been regulated by Law No. 6216, dated 30 March 2011, according to which such complaints are examined by one of the two sections of the Court presided over by a Deputy President of the Court and composed of seven members (Article 22). No constitutional complaints are allowed against legislative acts or the regulatory acts of the administration (Article 45(3) ). If a violation is caused by a judicial decision, the case is referred back to the relevant court for a retrial. In cases where no legal benefit can be obtained from a retrial, the applicant may be awarded compensation (Article 50). The Law stipulates that the Court shall examine constitutional complaints against the acts that became final after 23 September 2012 (transitional Article 1(8)).
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C. Areas Still in Need of Reform in the Judiciary
Despite the above mentioned developments, there are still major problems with the Turkish judiciary, as reflected by the high percentage of ECtHR judgments on the violations of Article 6 of the Convention, which secured the right to a fair trial: 700 out of 2,200 judgments pronounced against Turkey in the period 1995-2010. 70 These problems have been identified as follows:
Excessive Length of Proceedings and Resort to Remands in Custody
As of 22 September 2011, the execution of 233 judgments concerning excessively lengthy procedures before all types of courts in Turkey was pending before the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers. 71 In 2010 alone, the ECtHR found that in eighty-three cases there had been violations of the Convention owing to the excessive length of proceedings before Turkish courts.
72 This problem, with major human rights implications, is due to:
heavy workload of the judiciary, lack of competent personnel, automatically granted adjournments, over-reliance of the prosecutors on the police forces in the investigation, the long-established practice of going from arrest of suspected persons toward evidence rather than the opposite, immediate initiating of proceedings by prosecutors, preparation of long, intricate and often irrelevant indictments, and the lack of an effective domestic remedy to challenge the length of proceedings before the outcome of an ongoing trial. 73 Excessive resort to and length of detention on remand in violation of Article 5 of the Convention, which secures the right to liberty, is yet another problem, with 144 judgments of the ECtHR under supervision of execution by the Committee of Ministers. The Court repeatedly found that Turkish courts fail to justify appropriately their decisions of detention in custody, do not resort to other alternatives, and do not take into account the health conditions of the detained. All of these characteristics constitute violations of Article 3 of the ECHR, which secures the prohibition of torture and other cruel or degrading treatment.
The Role of Courts in Combating Impunity for Serious Human Rights Violations
The ineffectiveness of domestic proceedings relating to serious human rights violations by members of security forces has been a major concern for a long time. The Court of Strasbourg has ruled on a large number of violations of Article 2, which secures the right to life, and Article 3, resulting from the actions of the Turkish security forces. 74 Despite recent reforms in the Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure, the findings of the ECtHR seem to confirm the structural nature of the problem of impunity in Turkey, as demonstrated by many cases where criminal proceedings brought against police officers, who practiced torture, have been inadequate or by cases in which the state failed to protect the victim's life, such as in the case of Hrant Dink. 75 Moreover, the practice of police officers accused of misconduct bringing charges against the plaintiffs who, in turn, do not benefit from an effective police complaint mechanism, is against the principles established in the case law of the ECtHR concerning effective investigations. 76 The disproportionately lenient sentences by Turkish courts, including high courts, toward security forces that have perpetrated serious human rights violations, are another matter of concern. 77 All of the above demonstrate the highly state-centric approach of the Turkish judge.
Other Major Problems in Criminal Proceedings
Other major problems in criminal proceedings include a) the courts' interpretation of the Turkish Anti-Terror Act which allows a very wide margin of appreciation and results in countless convictions on the grounds of "membership in a terrorist organization," b) restrictions of the right to defense such as no access to the prosecution file by the defense lawyer, no practice of cross-examination, and acceptance of testimonies by "secret witnesses" while the defense has difficulties in summoning witnesses, and c) derogations from ordinary criminal procedures applied by assize courts with special powers dealing with crimes against the security of the state with longer detention periods, incommunicado custody, restrictions imposed upon the defense, and trials in absentia. 78 Against this background and concerned by the high number of judgments delivered by the ECtHR against Turkey, the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Council of Europe considered in his latest report on the subject "that the effective implementation of these judgments requires amendments of the letter and spirit of the Turkish Constitution, statutory legislation and regulations, institutional changes, awareness-raising and capacity-building within the judicial system."
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IV. CoNCLUSIoN
This study has tried to show that the impact of the ECtHR rulings on Turkey's legislations and judicial practices has been on the whole positive but limited. Despite considerable improvements brought about by constitutional amendments and changes in ordinary laws, major democratic deficits and inconsistencies with the standard European human rights practices remain wide. Such inconsistencies, as described above, concern mostly freedom of expression, freedom of association (especially in connection with the party prohibition rules), minority rights, the length of judicial proceedings, and excessively long detention periods.
On 11 April 2013, Law No. 6459, commonly referred to as the "fourth judiciary reform bill," was adopted. The law's declared aim is to improve Turkey's standing before the European Court of Human Rights, especially with regard to freedom of expression. The 27 article law introduces a number of significant improvements. 80 Thus, the second paragraph of Article 6 of the Anti-Terror law, which criminalizes those who publish declarations and statements of terrorist organizations, was narrowed to statements that 78 legitimize, praise, or encourage violent actions. Identical amendments were made in Article 7 (paragraph 2) of the same law criminalizing propaganda for terrorist organizations and Article 220 of the Turkish Criminal Code, which penalizes propaganda for conspiratorial organizations that were established for the purpose of committing crimes. Article 94 of Turkish Criminal Code was amended to abolish the statute of limitations for torture crimes. Article 215 of the same law, which forbids the praising of crimes and criminals, was amended so that such action would constitute a criminal offense only if it leads to a "clear and present danger to public order." The controversial Article 318 of the same law that criminalizes anti-militarist propaganda was narrowed to such statements intended to encourage fugitives from military services. On the other hand, the law did not introduce improvements to the long detention periods and the controversial Article 301 of the Criminal Code that penalizes insulting the Turkish nation and certain public institutions. This law is an important step toward bringing Turkish legislation closer to European standards, even though liberal critics regard it as insufficient to meet expectations. However, very few releases have taken place following the publication of the law in cases where thousands of Kurdish militants have been under trial, in detention on allegations of terrorist propaganda or aiding and abetting members of the terrorist organization. This is another piece of evidence of the pro-state, illiberal mentality of the Turkish judiciary as alluded to above. The slowness of the democratic reform process is partly due to the increasing Turkish disenchantment with the EU-accession negotiations. Indeed, between 1999 and 2006 the hope for full membership in the near future provided a strong stimulus for democratic reforms, including major constitutional amendments and nine "harmonization packages" designed to adapt Turkish legislation to the EU standards. However, objections by important EU-member states toward Turkey's full membership, even in the long run, created a sense of hopelessness in the Turkish public opinion. This was indicated by the declining level of support for the EU membership, and resulted in a weakening of the EU's leverage on the democratization process.
A second factor is the unwillingness of the Turkish judiciary, in general, to conform to the European human rights standards. Indeed, the 2004 amendment to Article 90 of the Constitution, which placed the provisions of international human rights conventions above Turkish domestic laws, had the potential to lead to an almost revolutionary improvement in Turkish human rights standards. However, as pointed out above, the Turkish judiciary's attitudes toward it can, at best, be termed as lukewarm, if not outright cool. The Turkish judiciary's statist and nationalist perceptions can be explained by the specific characteristics of the Turkish modernization and of its nation-building process. The result is an interesting paradox that the judiciary, in most countries the most ardent supporter of human rights and individual liberties, has often been less liberal than the elected branches of government in Turkey.
